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A COMPARISON OF FLOAT OWNERSHIP
ISSUES FOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
BETWEEN TAIWAN AND CHINA
Ming-Teh Wang1, Su-Ling Fan2, Chi-Chen Tsai1, and Luh-Maan Chang1
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ABSTRACT
Float ownership is a controversial issue in construction projects. This study, which focuses on Taiwan and China, finds
that attitudes regarding float ownership differ among stakeholders with different national and occupational backgrounds.
To avoid disputes, practitioners should notice these differences
before signing contracts. This study uses surveys to identify
the potential differences in attitude regarding three important
float ownership issues. The results vary from a previous study
undertaken in the United Kingdom. The major findings of the
study include: (1) contracts need to include clauses related to
float ownership; (2) Taiwanese contractors and Chinese owners tend to view the float as their own; (3) the concept that the
party delaying the critical path should take full responsibility
may not be practical in resolving inconsistent opinions between the contractor and the owner; (4) the idea of granting
contractor time or compensation when owner uses up float is
acceptable; and (5) viewpoints of Taiwanese and Chinese
neutral parties have no significant differences.

I. INTRODUCTION
Float ownership is a controversial issue (Al-Gahtani, 2009;
Hanson, 2006) and is fundamental to delay analysis (Peters,
2003). In delay analysis, we always take the term “float” to
mean “total float,” which “represents the amount of the time by
which the early finish date of any activity may be delayed
without delaying the completion of the project.” (Person, 1991)
Ownership is “the exclusive right to use, possess, and dispose of
property.” (Martin, 2003) Therefore the meaning of float ownership should be the right to use, possess, and dispose of float.
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Currently, there are three prevailing viewpoints regarding
float ownership: (1) the contractor owns the float, (2) the owner
owns the float, and (3) the project owns the float (Keane and
Caletka, 2008). Though each idea is well supported, all three
of these viewpoints have their weaknesses (Householder and
Rutland, 1990; Person, 1991; Zack, 1993; De La Garza et al.,
2007; Trauner et al., 2009). Courts and boards of contract
appeals are accustomed to treating the float as belonging to
the project on a first come-first served basis. Thus, the party
which delays the critical path should take all responsibility.
This concept is related to the legal principle which is called the
“causation principle of proximate cause” (Wickwire, 2003) or
the proximate cause principle.
However, this concept may not be accepted by some practitioners. The issue of whether compensation is justified when
the float is used is another complicated issue. Certain protocols and specifications, such as the UK’s Society of Construction Law Delay and Disruption Protocol (SCL protocol)
(SCL, 2002) and the US’s AACE International Recommended
Practice 29R-03 Forensic Schedule Analysis Practice Guide
(FSAPG 29R-03) formally address this issue (AACE, 2011).
The UK’s SCL protocol states that the time can only be extended if the owner affects the path which has zero total float
(Core Principle 7), and the contractor is entitled to compensation if the float is used by the owner (Core Principle 8). The
US’s FSAPG 29R-03 states that the project owns the “Network Float” (Subsection 4.3.E). That means that the contractor might not have to recover compensation for the owner’s
non-critical delay (Keane and Caletka, 2008).
Using contract language is a good method to resolve float
ownership issues. In Taiwan and China, however, there are no
provisions regarding float ownership included in the standard
form of contracts (SAIC, 1999; PCC, 2008). Taiwan and China
are both members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and have acceded to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). As a result, companies from each country are able
to seek business in the other country in order to expand their
construction markets. With a shared linguistic and cultural
background, the opportunities for joint ventures in international construction markets by companies from Taiwan and
China are also increased. Consistent recognition of float
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Table 1. Comparison of Institutions in Taiwan and China.
Institution
Informal constraints

Cultural norms

Formal constraints

Economic system
Legal system
Law enforcement

Taiwan
Group-oriented, guanxi
(interpersonal relationships)
Free market economy
Civil law system
Rule of law

ownership in construction contracts can reduce disputes.
However, standard forms in Taiwanese and Chinese construction contracts typically do not include any specific or standard
float clauses. Hence, project participants from Taiwan and
China may disagree on the issue of float ownership.
The reasons why project participants from Taiwan and
China may perceive float ownership differently may be attributed to their institutions. Market mechanisms in Taiwan
and China differ greatly. Taiwan has a free-market economy,
while China has made its transition from a centrally planned to
a free market economy (Myers, 2008). For law enforcement,
contractors in Taiwan mainly prefer to rely on mediation and
arbitration to settle construction project disputes (PCC, 2001),
whereas China prefers to make use of negotiation (Chan and
Suen, 2005; Ling and Low, 2007). Additionally, administrative intervention by the government plays a major role in
China (Table 1).
To date, most research has focused on the issue of float
management when performing delay analysis to determine
who is responsible for the delay (Pasiphol and Popescu, 1995;
Al-Gahtani, 2007; De La Garza et al., 2007; Al-Gahtani, 2009).
However, research has seldom addressed why participants hold
different viewpoints regarding float ownership. Depending on
the different positions of float ownership, the results of the
delay analysis can vary (Arditi, 2006). The study advances
research in comparisons of float ownership issues for two
countries. The study, taking the cases of Taiwan and China,
focuses on identifying differences and similarities in attitudes
regarding float ownership in the early stages of a disagreement,
thus avoiding the need to solve disputes in the later and more
complicated stages of a dispute. After presenting the data, we
discuss the reasons for the results and compare the results with
a previous study from the United Kingdom. The study is presented as a step towards using Fisher’s exact test to diagnose
the similarities and differences in float ownership. If participants in international projects are able to fully discern their
differences of opinion regarding float ownership, they may
experience fewer disputes.

II. METHOD
1. Participants and Procedure
This paper surveys attitudes regarding float ownership issues among construction professionals in Taiwan and China.
The survey results are then analyzed and meaningful findings
are identified. The sample was selected from the authors’

China
Group-oriented, guanxi
(interpersonal relationships)
Transition economy
Civil law system
Executive-led government

pre-existing lists of construction professionals, as well as
information gathered from the internet. Using a purposive
sampling, 477 participants working in government offices,
courts, universities, law firms, construction companies, construction law society, and arbitration institutes were selected
and asked for their views via e-mail and hard copy. A total of
99 questionnaires were properly completed. The respondents
were divided into six groups based on their occupation and the
type of work they were engaged in: Taiwanese contractors’
respondents (TCR), Taiwanese owners’ respondents (TOR),
Taiwanese neutral parties (TNP), Chinese contractors’ respondents (CCR), Chinese owners’ respondents (COR), and Chinese
neutral parties (CNP). Participants placed in the owner’s respondents category include government employees, contract
administrators, and supervision engineers. The contractor’s
respondents category includes both main contractors and subcontractors. The neutral parties’ category includes lawyers,
university professors, claim consultants, and arbitrators.
2. Measurement and Analyses
We have adapted the questionnaire of Scott et al. (2004),
who surveyed practitioners in the United Kingdom for float
ownership measurement (Scott et al., 2004). The three important float ownership issues from that study are: (1) who
owns the float; (2) who is responsible for the delay if the
contractor consumes float first; and (3) who is responsible for
the delay if the owner consumes the float first. These three
issues have been discussed in the other studies (Pickavance,
2000; Arditi, 2006) as well. Therefore, the instrument of Scott
et al. (2004). appears to have good content validity. The questionnaire used in this research includes three questions, each
corresponding to an issue mentioned above.
The first question (Q1) is: who owns the float? There are
five answers to choose from: (1) the contractor should have the
right to use the float; (2) the owner should have the right to use
the float; (3) the float may be used by either the contractor or
the owner, according to whichever party requires it; (4) float
ownership should be clearly defined in the contract; and (5)
don’t know. In Q1, unlike the original questionnaire of Scott
et al. (2004), we replaced the answer “Where the contractor
does not require it, the employer should have use of the float.”
with the option of “the project owns the float.”
The second question (Q2) and third question (Q3) are both
based on the case study used by Scott et al. (2004): a construction project for a building has eight work items with two
possible implementation paths (the “as planned” schedule,
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Table 2. Basic information of the hypothetical case.
Activity
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Activity Name
Clear site and set up offices
Pier foundations
Erect steelwork
Paint steelwork
Clear site
Services
Erect lamp posts and signs
Footpath paving & guardrail

Duration (Weeks)
2
3
2
1
1
2
1
1

1

Activity Name
Clear site and set up offices
Pier foundations
Erect steelwork
Paint steelwork
Clear site
Services
Erect lamp posts and signs
Footpath paving & guardrail

2

3

4

5

6

7

Predecessors
1
2(FS-1)
3
4, 8
1
6
7

8

9

10

Fig. 1. Hypothetical case: as-planned schedule.

Scenario 1
Clear site and set up offices
Pier foundations
Erect steelwork
Paint steelwork
Clear site
Services
Erect lamp posts and signs
Footpath paving & guardrail

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

The owner delay is the
proximate cause
Contractor delay
Owner delay

Fig. 2. Hypothetical case: as-built schedule for scenario 1.

shown in Table 2 and Fig. 1). For reasons attributable to the
contractor, work is delayed (delivery of the lampposts is delayed), leading to a one-week delay in implementing the “erect
lamp posts & signs” work item. Subsequently, there is a further delay attributable to the owner (instructions to perform
additional footpath paving), leading to a one-week delay in
implementing the “footpath paving and guardrail” work item.
These two delays cause a combined one-week delay in overall
project completion (i.e. the path in question had a one-week
float). The study uses the formulas to describe the allocation
of the one-week delay responsibility between the owner and
the contractor. For example, in the formulas below, such as
(T1, C1, D1), T1 denotes that the owner grants the contractor
an extension of the construction period by one week, C1 denotes that the owner pays the contractor prolongation costs for
a period of one week, and D1 denotes that the contractor
should pay the owner liquidated damages for a period of one
week.
The second question (Q2) is: if contractor-caused delay has
occurred first, with owner-caused delay occurring later, how

should responsibility for the loss resulting from the one-week
delay be apportioned between the owner and the contractor?
The “as built” schedule is shown as a Gantt chart in Fig. 2.
There are five answers to choose from: (T0, C0, D1), (T1, C0,
D0), (T1, C1, D0), (T0.5, C0.5, D0.5), and “don’t know.” The
third question (Q3) is: if the owner-caused delay has occurred
first, with the contractor-caused delay occurring later, how
should responsibility for the loss resulting from the one-week
delay be apportioned between the owner and the contractor?
The “as built” schedule is shown as a Gantt chart in Fig. 3.
There are six answers to choose from: (T0, C0, D0), (T0, C0,
D1), (T1, C0, D0), (T1, C1, D0), (T0.5, C0.5, D0.5), and
“don’t know.” In Q2 and Q3, a “don’t know” answer choice is
added, since the concept of float ownership is not yet widely
known in Taiwan and China.
Various analysis methods and procedures were employed in
this research. First, the surveyed data was entered into the
computer software of Statistical Package for Social Sciences
(SPSS) version 16.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago). The most frequent
values for each group were entered in place of missing values

Journal of Marine Science and Technology, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2015 )

72

Table 3. Basic profile of respondents.
Nationality

Category

Numbers of respondents

Taiwan

Contractors’ Rep.
Owners’ Rep.
Neutral parties
Contractors’ Rep.
Owners’ Rep.
*
Neutral parties

27
21
11
15
13
12

China

Work experience (percentage for each category)
Less than 2 years
2 until 5 years
More than 5 years
3.7
0
96.3
9.5
0
90.4
0
27.3
72.8
26.7
53.3
20.0
23.1
30.8
46.2
27.3
18.2
54.6

*

Note. One person does not wish to reveal their work experience.

Scenario 2
Clear site and set up offices
Pier foundations
Erect steelwork
Paint steelwork
Clear site
Services
Erect lamp posts and signs
Footpath paving & guardrail

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

The contractor delay is
the proximate cause
Owner delay
Contractor delay

Fig. 3. Hypothetical case: as-built schedule for scenario 2.

100.00%

0.00%

7.41%

14.29%

90.00%
80.00%

8.33%

9.09%

25.93%

70.00%

Percent

15.38%

23.08%

60.00%

60.00%

14.81%

50.00%

7.41%

57.14%

7.69%

63.64%

58.33%

40.00%
46.15%

30.00%
20.00%

26.67%
44.44%
0.00%

10.00%
0.00%
unknown
defined by contract
first come, first served
owner
contractor

13.33%
TCR
7.41%
25.93%
14.81%
7.41%
44.44%

CCR
0.00%
60.00%
26.67%
0.00%
13.33%

9.52%
0.00%

9.09%
0.00%

19.05%

25.00%

18.18%

0.00%
8.33%

TNP
9.09%
63.64%
9.09%
0.00%
18.18%

CNP
8.33%
58.33%
25.00%
0.00%
8.33%

7.69%
TOR
14.29%
57.14%
9.52%
0.00%
19.05%

COR
15.38%
23.08%
7.69%
46.15%
7.69%

Fig. 4. Results of float ownership for issue 1.

(Kumar and Chadrasekar, 2010). Second, a clustered bar chart
generated by SPSS software was used to assess the initial
results. Finally, Fisher’s exact test, which is useful for comparing nominal variables between two groups (Colman and
Pulford, 2008) with relatively small size was used to detect
national and group differences. The two-sided significance

level was set at p = 0.05 at the 95% confidence level.

III. RESULTS
Table 3 displays the basic profile of the respondents to the
survey in the study. 59 completed questionnaires were ob-

M.-T. Wang et al.: A Comparison of Float Ownership Issues for Construction Projects between Taiwan and China

73

Table 4. Statistical results for issue 1.
TCR
—
0.109
0.226
0.064
0.018*
0.098

TCR
TOR
TNP
CCR
COR
CNP
Note. * P < 0.05

100.00%
90.00%

7.41%
0.00%

80.00%
70.00%

TOR

TNP

CCR

COR

CNP

—
1.000
0.323
0.007*
0.634

—
0.552
0.041*
0.829

—
0.004*
0.922

—
0.031*

—

6.67%

9.52%
26.67%

0.00%

4.76%
15.38%

0.00%

20.00%
33.33%

7.69%
19.05%

44.44%
23.08%

Percent

60.00%
50.00%
50.00%

33.33%

40.00%

30.77%
48.15%

20.00%

20.00%
23.08%

10.00%

unknown
T0.5, C0.5, D0.5
T1, C1, D0
T1, C0, D0
T0, C0, D1

33.33%

66.67%

30.00%

0.00%

16.67%

30.00%
16.67%

13.33%
0.00%
TCR
7.41%
0.00%
44.44%
48.15%
0.00%

CCR
6.67%
26.67%
33.33%
20.00%
13.33%

0.00%
TOR
4.76%
9.52%
19.05%
66.67%
0.00%

COR
15.38%
7.69%
23.08%
30.77%
23.08%

0.00%
TNP
0.00%
20.00%
50.00%
30.00%
0.00%

CNP
0.00%
33.33%
16.67%
33.33%
16.67%

Fig. 5. Results of float ownership for issue 2.

tained in Taiwan, including 27 from contractors’ respondents,
21 from owners’ respondents, and 11 from neutral parties. 40
completed questionnaires were obtained from China, including 15 from contractors’ respondents, 13 from owners’ respondents, and 12 from neutral parties.
1. Results of Issue 1: Initial Float Ownership Issue
Fig. 4 shows the results of float ownership for issue 1. Most
Taiwanese contractors’ respondents (TCR) said that the float
belongs to the contractor (44.44%), which is very different
from other surveyed groups in Taiwan. Similarly, Chinese
owners’ respondents (COR) most commonly agree that the
float belongs to the owner (46.15%), which is also very different from other surveyed groups in China. The other 4
groups all support the idea that the bearer of the right to use the
float should be clearly defined in the contract (TOR = 57.14%,
TNP = 63.64%, CCR = 60.00%, CNP = 58.33%).

Fisher’s exact test further confirms these differences. Table
4 shows that, at the 95% confidence level, there is a significant relationship (P < 0.05) between the following pairs:
Taiwanese contractors’ respondents and Chinese owners’ respondents (P = 0.018), Taiwanese owners’ respondents and
Chinese owners’ respondents (P = 0.007), Taiwanese neutral
parties and Chinese owners’ respondents (P = 0.041), Chinese
contractors’ respondents and Chinese owners’ respondents
(P = 0.004), Chinese neutral parties and Chinese owners’ respondents (P = 0.031).
2. Results of Issue 2: Contractor Delays First
Fig. 5 shows the results of float ownership for issue 2.
Taiwanese contractors’ respondents (TCR) are most likely to
choose T1, C0, D0 (= 48.15%), whereas for Chinese it was T1,
C1, D0 (= 33.33%). Among owner respondents, Taiwanese
are most likely to choose T1, C0, D0 (= 66.67%), whereas for
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Table 5. Statistical results for issue 2.
TCR
—
0.110
0.154
0.007*
0.022*
0.002*

TCR
TOR
TNP
CCR
COR
CNP
Note. * P < 0.05

100.00%
90.00%
80.00%

TOR

TNP

CCR

COR

CNP

—
0.125
0.028*
0.083
0.083

—
0.804
0.320
0.381

—
0.670
0.840

—
0.556

—

7.41%
0.00%

6.67%

22.22%

26.67%

4.76%
4.76%

0.00%
9.09%
0.00%
9.09%

0.00%

0.00%

20.00%

16.67%

19.05%
20.00%

70.00%

33.33%

Percent

60.00%
50.00%

37.04%

33.33%

38.10%

63.64%
16.67%

40.00%
50.00%
6.67%

30.00%
20.00%

23.81%

25.93%

25.00%

26.67%
10.00%

18.18%
9.52%

7.41%
0.00%
unknown
T0.5, C0.5, D0.5
T1, C1, D0
T1, C0, D0
T0, C0, D1
T0, C0, D0

TCR
7.41%
0.00%
22.22%
37.04%
25.93%
7.41%

0.00%
CCR
6.67%
26.67%
33.33%
6.67%
26.67%
0.00%

TOR
4.76%
4.76%
19.05%
38.10%
23.81%
9.52%

COR
0.00%
9.09%
0.00%
9.09%
63.64%
18.18%

10.00%
0.00%
TNP
0.00%
20.00%
20.00%
50.00%
10.00%
0.00%

8.33%
CNP
0.00%
16.67%
33.33%
16.67%
25.00%
8.33%

Fig. 6. Results of float ownership for issue 3.

Chinese it was T1, C0, D0 (= 30.77%). For neutral parties,
most Taiwanese chose T1, C1, D0 (= 50.00%), whereas Chinese were more likely to choose T1, C0, D0 (= 33.33%) and
T0.5, C0.5, D0.5 (= 33.33%).
Fisher’s exact test of the results obtained for issue 2, as
shown in Table 5, it is noted, at the 95% confidence level,
there is a significant relationship between the following pairs:
Taiwanese contractors’ respondents and Chinese contractors’
respondents (P = 0.007), Taiwanese contractors’ respondents
and Chinese owners’ respondents (P = 0.022), Taiwanese
contractors’ respondents and Chinese neutral parties (P =
0.002), and Taiwanese owners’ respondents and Chinese contractors’ respondents (P = 0.028).
3. Results of Issue 3: Owner Delays First
Fig. 6 shows the results of float ownership for issue 3. Among
contractor respondents, Taiwanese contractors’ respondents

(TCR) most commonly chose T1, C0, D0 (= 37.04%), whereas
for Chinese it was T1, C1, D0 (= 33.33%). For owner respondents, Taiwanese owners most commonly preferred T1,
C0, D0 (= 38.10%), which is very different from the most
popular Chinese choice of T0, C0, D1 (= 63.64%). In the
category of neutral parties, Taiwanese neutral parties, like
other Taiwanese groups, were most likely to choose T1, C0,
D0 (= 50.00%), whereas Chinese neutral parties were most
likely to choose T1, C1, D0 (= 33.33%).
Fisher’s exact test analysis of the results obtained for issue
3 suggests that Chinese owners’ attitudes are very different
from those of TCR, TOR, TNP, and CCR. Table 6 shows that
at the 95% confidence level, there is a significant relationship
between the following pairs: Taiwanese contractors’ respondents and Chinese contractors’ respondents (P = 0.025), Chinese
owners’ respondents and Taiwanese contractors’ respondents
(P = 0.026), Chinese owners’ respondents and Taiwanese
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Table 6. Statistical results for issue 3.
TCR
TOR
TNP
CCR
COR
CNP
Note. * P < 0.05

TCR
—
0.974
0.281
0.025*
0.026*
0.276

TOR

TNP

CCR

COR

CNP

—
0.669
0.097
0.084
0.672

—
0.173
0.010*
0.480

—
0.044*
0.924

—
0.164

—

neutral parties (P = 0.010), Chinese owners’ respondents and
Chinese contractors’ respondents (P = 0.044).

IV. DISSCUSSION
In this study, we propose that construction stakeholders
with different national and occupational backgrounds have
different attitudes regarding float ownership. A key contribution of the study is its range of data, gathered from multiple
principle stakeholders–owners, contractors and neutral parties.
Further, we investigated respondents from more than one
country in the construction industry, an approach seldom taken
in previous research. Furthermore, Fisher’s exact test was
applied to search for statistical differences in the relatively
small sample size.
The findings of this study contribute to float ownership literature in the following ways. First, allowing float ownership
to be defined in the contract is clearly a popular option. The
results show that Taiwanese owners’ respondents, Taiwanese
neutral parties, Chinese contractors’ respondents and Chinese
neutral parties all think it better to clarify the float ownership
in the contract. This finding further supports the perception
found in other studies that float ownership should be regulated
in the contract (De Leon, 1986; Arditi and Pattanakitchamroon,
2006; Al-Gahtani, 2009).
Second, the results of this research suggest that Taiwanese
contractors and Chinese owners both view the float as belonging to themselves. This difference may be due to the
different transaction mechanisms in Taiwan and China. While
Taiwan possesses a free market economy and operates on
capitalist principles, China’s economy is planned in accordance with its communist system. If the float is viewed as a
kind of asset, in a communist system it must, like all other
assets, belong to the state, while in a capitalist system it is the
object of competition in the free market. While administrative
power is strong in a planned economy, the owner possesses the
greatest power to own assets in monopolistic construction
markets.
Third, the recent perspective provided by the common
practice that the party who delays the critical path should take
all responsibility may not be practical in resolving inconsistent
opinions between the contractor and the owner. This view
might even be used as a tool to support the contracting party

themselves. For taking Taiwanese contractors’ responses for
example, in issue 2, when the owner’s delay was the proximate
cause, 44.44% of Taiwanese contractors’ respondents chose
T1, C1, D0, however, when the contractor’s delay was the
proximate in issue 3, only 25.93% of Taiwanese contractors’
respondents chose T0, C0, D1.
Fourth, granting the contractor time or compensation seems
to be acceptable in both Taiwan and China. The results of
issue 3 demonstrate that even when the contractor is the proximate cause of project delay, several stakeholders, including
Taiwanese contractors’ respondents, Taiwanese owners’ respondents, Taiwanese neutral parties, Chinese contractors’
respondents and Chinese neutral parties, view the granting of
time or cost to contractor as acceptable.
Fifth, the study finds that the views of Taiwanese neutral
parties and Chinese neutral parties are similar. This is evidenced by the fact that neutral parties from different nationalities but the same occupation holding similar views. This is
in contrast to the opinions of Taiwanese contractors, which
differ from the opinions of Chinese contractors for issues 2
and 3, and the opinions of Taiwanese owners, which differ
from the opinions of Chinese owners on issue 1. Consequently,
findings show that decisions from neutral parties are not affected by their nationality or occupation. The opinions of
neutral parties may be an important reference for both contractors and owners.
Sixth, our study differs considerably from the British study
of Scott et al. (2004). Because there are different numbers in
each group in our study, a weighted summation calculation is
performed for calculating the overall results (Table 7). The
overall results show that Taiwanese respondents tend to view
the float ownership issue as a risk-sharing issue because a
plurality selected answer T1, C0, D0 in issues 2 and 3. Chinese respondents appear to hold the view that the float belongs
to the project because most of them selected T1, C0, D0 and
T0, C0, D1 in issues 2 and 3 respectively. Respondents from
the United Kingdom, however, appeared to hold the view that
the float belongs to the contractor because most hose T1, C1,
D0 both in issue 2 and 3. Both Chinese and Taiwanese contractors are reluctant to claim compensation when a delay has
occurred, which may be attributed to the fact that both Taiwan
and China have similar culture norms. Taiwanese and Chinese
contractors are likely to view maintaining good guanxi
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Table 7. Overall statistical results.
Countries surveyed
Survey in Taiwan
Survey in China
Survey in the UK

Issue 1
Answer category
Defined by contract
Defined by contract
Contractor

(interpersonal relationships) with the owner or owner as being
more important than claiming compensation. In both Taiwan
and the United Kingdom an extension of time may be granted
in issue 3, perhaps attributable to their free market economies
where the general feeling is that ownership of the float can be
treated as private property.
There is a limitation to this research. The response rate of
this survey is 20.8%. The reason for this low response rate
may be due to the conservative norms of Taiwanese and Chinese culture, which shows reluctance to express opinions in
questionnaires. Notwithstanding the limitation, the study
illustrates several practical implications. Despite the shared
linguistic and cultural background of Taiwanese stakeholders
and Chinese stakeholders, both parties should maintain caution when handling float ownership. In particular, Taiwanese
stakeholders need to clarify float ownership issues with
Chinese owners before they sign a contract. So do Chinese
stakeholders who cooperate with Taiwanese contractors. If
owners and contractors cannot reach an agreement, advice of
neutral parties will be helpful for both parties.
In this paper, we offer a research into three float ownership
issues, which are selected for comparison between Taiwan and
China. Having a comparison between the two, we hope that in
the future the scale of similar research will be enlarged in order
to investigate these issues even more thoroughly in the
cross-strait context. For example, future questionnaires might
take into account the factors of transaction mechanisms, law
enforcement, the proximate cause principle or neutral events.
In addition, future studies could also use economic analysis to
model float ownership, based on the functions of schedule
planning and float usage, and their impact on both the timing
and cost to the project parties.

V. CONCLUSIONS
The study investigated the opinions collected by Taiwanese
and Chinese construction participants on float ownership
issues. The main findings of the study are: (1) clearly defining
float ownership in the contract is a preference of most participants except Chinese owners and Taiwanese contractors;
(2) both Taiwanese contractors and Chinese owners contend
that the float should belong to themselves; (3) the concept that
the party delaying the critical path should take full responsibility may not be practical in resolving inconsistent opinions
between the contractor and the owner; (4) the idea of granting
the contractor time or compensation, when the owner uses up

Issue 2
Answer category
T1, C0, D0
T1, C0, D0
T1, C1, D0

Issue 3
Answer category
T1, C0, D0
T0, C0, D1
T1, C1, D0

the float and project delay occurs, is acceptable in Taiwan and
China, except Chinese owners; (5) the neutral parties of Taiwan and China have no significant differences on the three
survey issues to each other; and (6) the attitudes regarding
float ownership from Taiwanese and Chinese stakeholders are
considerably different from those of British ones.
Although Taiwan and China possess similar cultural backgrounds and legal systems, the different institutions of their
economies and marketing mechanisms may induce divergent
opinions on these issues. However, if participants can reconcile these different opinions in executing a project, the disputes may be reduced and efficiency of the project can be
greatly enhanced.
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